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HUGHES V. HU: TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN 
DETERMINING CAREMARK LIABILITY FOR FOREIGN-BASED 
DELAWARE INCORPORATED COMPANIES 
IAN J. MURRAY* 
 
In Hughes v. Hu,1 the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the 
Caremark liability2 of Kandi Technologies Group, Inc.,3 a Delaware 
corporation that principally does business in China.4  The court5 noted that 
Kandi’s board of directors did not implement nor maintain sufficient board-
level oversight controls for the company’s accounting practices or related-
party transactions.6  Therefore, the court correctly7 held that Kandi’s board 
of directors faced a substantial threat of liability under Caremark and denied 
the board’s motion to dismiss the shareholder derivative suit.8  The court’s 
decision was consistent with precedent,9 but the holding is likely to 
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 1. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 2. Caremark liability, also referred to as “Caremark claims,” arises when a director breaches 
their fiduciary duty of loyalty by not making “a good faith effort to oversee the company’s 
operations.”  Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820–21 (Del. 2019), vacated, No. 2017-0586-
JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018). 
 3. Kandi Technologies Group, Inc. is primarily in the business of developing, producing, and 
distributing parts of electric vehicles.  Kandi Technologies Group Inc. Profile, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/companies/KNDI.OQ (Feb. 5, 2021, 3:59 PM).  Kandi also produces off-
road vehicles.  Id.  
 4. Hughes, slip op. at 4, 28–29. 
 5. This Note will refer to the Delaware Court of Chancery as the “Delaware Court of 
Chancery,” the “Delaware Chancery Court,” the “court of chancery,” and the “chancery court” 
interchangeably, and the Delaware Supreme Court as the “Delaware Supreme Court.” 
 6. See infra Section I.B. 
 7. See infra Section IV.A. 
 8. Hughes, slip op. at 37–38. 
 9. See infra Section IV.A. 
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exacerbate a recent trend.10  The trend is the avoidance of and exodus by 
corporations—particularly those principally operating abroad—from 
choosing Delaware as their source of corporate governance law.11  This 
heightened avoidance is because the holding in Hughes represents a potential 
operational incompatibility between Delaware corporate governance 
standards and typical non-American business practices.12  Directors of 
foreign corporations will likely see the Hughes holding as a signal for 
potential litigation risks should they continue their typical business practices 
and incorporate in Delaware.13 
After synthesizing Delaware’s Caremark jurisprudence, this Note calls 
for Delaware courts to factor in a business’s underlying market practices14 
when determining the acceptable level of oversight for companies.15  This 
approach would not lessen the requirements for boards under the duty of 
oversight but rather allow for the Delaware courts to better assess a 
company’s “good faith” efforts in meeting the duty.16  Although the Delaware 
legislature could also attempt to address this issue, the Delaware courts have 
the greater institutional capacity to reach case-by-case determinations.17  By 
allowing for “territorial adjustments” when considering Caremark liability, 
Delaware can maintain its preeminent position as an international supplier of 
corporation law.18 
I. THE CASE  
A. The Company and the Parties 
The case of Hughes v. Hu19 concerns seven members from Kandi 
Technologies Group’s (the “company”) executive management and board of 
directors who served during the company’s accounting control problems.20  
The named defendants include the company’s CEO and chairman of its board 
of directors: Xiaoming Hu; three successive CFOs: Xiaoying Zhu, Cheng 
 
 10. See infra Section IV.B. 
 11. See infra Section IV.B. 
 12. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 296–302. 
 15. See infra Section IV.C. 
 16. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 286–295 and accompanying text. 
 18. Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets 
Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 426 (2003) (“Delaware . . . is widely recognized as the most 
significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes . . . .”); see infra Section IV.C. 
 19. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).  
 20. Id. at 1–2. 
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Wang, and Bing Mei; and the three directors who formed the company’s 
audit committee: Jerry Lewin, Henry Yu, and Liming Chen.21  The company 
is a publicly-traded Delaware corporation—currently based in Jinhua, 
China—specializing in manufacturing parts used in electric vehicle 
production.22  The company was created via a reverse merger23 in 2007 with 
a—now-defunct but still publicly listed—Delaware corporation to access 
American capital markets.24  William Hughes, Jr. (“Hughes”) is a shareholder 
in the company and brought this derivative suit on behalf of the company.25  
B. A Timeline of Events: Sustained or Systemic Failures 
Although the series of events that ultimately lead to this case span 
several years, the timeline of the facts can be broken into roughly three 
distinct periods.26  Section I.B.1 details the issues with the company’s 
financial reports between 2010 and 2014 and the company’s resolution to 
address them.27  Section I.B.2 describes the sustained problems with the 
company’s financial reports after 2014 and the key admissions of 
unreliability that eventually lead to this case.28  Section I.B.3 details the 
plaintiff’s Section 220 request and the company’s response.29 
1. Audits and Reports Between 2010 And 2014 
The company’s outside auditing firm, AWC (CPA) Limited (hereinafter 
“AWC”),30 identified “key audit risks” and “a key control weakness” 
involving the company’s treatment of related-party transactions31—
transactions in which the parties are connected by some preexisting 
 
 21. Id. at 1–2, 18–19. 
 22. Id. at 4.  The company is listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market under the ticker symbol, 
KNDI.  Kandi Technologies Group Inc. Profile, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/ 
companies/KNDI.OQ (Feb. 5, 2021, 3:59 PM). 
 23. “Reverse [m]ergers” are a means for private companies to access American capital markets 
without going through the lengthy and complex process of going public.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
INVESTOR BULLETIN: REVERSE MERGERS 1 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ 
reversemergers.pdf.  Generally, the public company—acting as a “shell”—acquires the private 
company, and the “shareholders of the private operating company exchange their shares for a large 
majority of the shares of the public company.”  Id. 
 24. Hughes, slip op. at 4. 
 25. Id. at 1. 
 26. See infra Sections I.B.1–3. 
 27. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 28. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 29. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 30. The court appeared skeptical of the AWC’s independence as AWC had no other clients 
other than the company.  Hughes, slip op. at 5. 
 31.  Id. at 5. 
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means32—during its limited audit of the company’s 2010 financial statements 
(the “2010 Audit”).33  In the two subsequent audits—the 2011 and 2012 
audits, respectively—AWC identified additional risks.34 
As part of its 2013 10-K annual report35 (“2013 10-K”), the company 
disclosed that its “disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of 
December 31, 2013, due to a material weakness.”36  The company’s 2013 10-
K also described the company’s efforts to address the material weakness’s 
contributing sources and pledged that its audit committee would review all 
related-party transactions.37  
The company’s audit committee38 met twice within two months of the 
2013 10-K filing: once for forty-five minutes and again, three weeks later, 
for forty minutes.39  During these meetings, the audit committee reviewed 
 
 32. Will Kenton, Related-Party Transaction, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/related-partytransaction.asp (Oct. 27, 2020).  
 33. Hughes, slip op. at 5.  Specifically, AWC found that the company recorded transactions 
with one of their largest customers, Kandi USA, under a different name.  Id.  AWC inquired if Kandi 
USA was a related party—Kandi USA is owned by the CEO’s son, Wangyuan Hu, and therefore a 
related party—but received no response.  Id.  AWC did not follow up.  Id.  At the CEO’s behest, 
AWC eliminated any references to Kandi USA in their audit trail by placing the questioned 
transactions in another customer’s account.  Id.  Additionally, AWC found that the company parked 
large amounts of cash in an officer’s and employee’s personal bank accounts.  Id.  AWC conducted 
no additional investigation as to why the company placed the money in the personal bank accounts, 
nor did AWC inquire if the cash constituted a disclosure worthy related-party transaction.  Id. at 5–
6. 
 34. In the 2011 audit, AWC identified a borrower in possession of a single note valued at $33.1 
million—out of a $37.9 million notes receivable balance—had not paid interest on the note in 2011.  
Id. at 6–7.  AWC conducted no additional evaluation of the borrower’s creditworthiness, nor did it 
raise concern regarding the note’s collectability.  Id.  Similar to the risks identified in the “2010 
Audit,” AWC’s 2012 audit (the “2012 Audit”) revealed the company had several transactions not 
properly marked as related-party transactions.  Id. at 7. 
 35. Under federal securities laws, companies must routinely disclose information to the public.  
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-
basics/glossary/form-10-k (February 10, 2021) (“The annual report on Form 10-K provides a 
comprehensive overview of the company’s business and financial condition and includes audited 
financial statements.”). 
 36. Hughes, slip op. at 7.  The court noted three factors from the 2013 10-K contributing to the 
“material weakness”: (i) the company’s internal audit department head reported to its CEO and not 
its audit committee; (ii) communication between the company’s internal audit department and its 
audit committee was lacking; and (iii) the company did not annually evaluate the effectiveness of 
its audit committee.  Id. at 7–8. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Members of the audit committee at this time consisted of all three director-defendants: Yu 
(chair and member since July 2011), Chen (member since May 2012), and Lewin (member since 
2010).  Id. at 8.  Non-committee members sometimes attended audit committee meetings; however, 
the core composition did not change during the time in question.  Id. at 8–9, 11–12 
 39. Id. at 8–9. 
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and approved a suite of items related to company matters.40  The company 
failed to produce documents from either of these meetings in response to the 
plaintiff’s Section 220 demand.41  In July 2014, the audit committee chair 
reviewed the remediation measures with management, the company’s 
internal audit team, and AWC.42  In its November 2014 disclosure, the 
company determined that the new internal controls “were effective” as of 
September 30, 2014.43 
2. Audits and Reports Post-2014 
The audit committee next met one year later, on March 13, 2015, to 
review and approve the company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the 2014 
calendar year (the “2014 10-K”).44  In fifty minutes, the committee reviewed 
the company’s year-end financial results and approved a “Policy of Related-
party Transaction Relating to JV Shareholder.”45  Three weeks after the 2014 
10-K was filed, the company’s board of directors—via unanimous written 
consent—adopted a sweeping set of resolutions.46 
The audit committee’s next meeting—lasting thirty minutes—was on 
March 7, 2016, to review and approve the company’s Annual Report on Form 
10-K for the 2015 calendar year (the “2015 10-K”).47  At this meeting, the 
company’s management represented that the company did not engage in any 
related-party transactions with Kandi USA during 2015.48  However, 
company management did report that the company engaged in related-party 
sales with the service company, describing those transactions as mainly 
 
 40. During the first meeting, the audit committee reviewed both “matters relating to relationship 
transaction[s],” documents regarding the company’s contract with Eliteway, and potential 
procedures for approval of “relationship transaction[s].”  Id. at 8–9.  During the latter meeting, the 
audit committee reviewed and approved a new “Internal Audit Activity Charter’” and a new 
“Management Policy on Related-Party Transactions.”  Id. at 9. 
 41. Id. at 9, 18.  Requests pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
allows shareholders to inspect “for any proper purpose” the business’s books and records.  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2020). 
 42. Hughes, slip op. at 10. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 11.  There were no meetings of the audit committee between the 2014 10-K meeting 
and the meeting on May 30, 2014.  Id. at 9, 11. 
 45. Id. at 11.  At the 2014 10-K’s filing, two days after its review, the company again described 
its disclosure controls and procedures as “effective.”  Id. 
 46. Id.  The court drew attention to three resolutions in particular: (i) the audit committee, as 
well as then-director Ni Guangzheng, qualified as independent directors for NASDAQ listing 
purposes; (ii) Yu and Lewin qualified as audit committee financial experts; and (iii) retaining AWC 
as the company’s independent auditor for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2015.  Id. at 11–12. 
 47. Id. at 12.  Again, the audit committee had no recorded meetings between the 2014 10-K 
meeting and the 2015 10-K meeting.  Id. at 11–12. 
 48. Id. at 12–13. 
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involving “battery sales.”49  On March 14, 2016, the company filed its 2015 
10-K.50  The company again described its disclosure controls and procedures 
as “effective.”51  Within two weeks of filing the 2015 10-K, the company’s 
audit committee—via unanimous written consent—approved a different 
description of the related-party transactions between the company and the 
service company.52  
On April 12, 2016, the company’s board of directors immediately 
replaced AWC with BDO China Shu Lun Pan CPAs (“BDO”) as the 
company’s auditor.53  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the 
“PCAOB”) brought disciplinary proceedings against AWC for AWC’s 
handling of the 2010, 2011, and 2012 audits shortly after the company 
replaced its auditor (the “PCAOB Orders”). 54  The PCAOB Orders prompted 
NASDAQ to request that the company verify its cash balances.55   
The audit committee reviewed the company’s Quarterly Report on Form 
10-Q56 on August 1, 2016, for one hour.57  The committee also discussed 
BDO’s cash balance audit, the company’s related-party transactions from the 
last six months,58 and the Chinese Government’s delay in subsidy payments 
to the joint venture.59 
In November 2016, the company disclosed that it had engaged in 
material transactions with Kandi USA—under its trade name Eliteway—in 
 
 49. Id.  The service company was Zhejiang ZuoZhongYou Electric Vehicle Service Co., Ltd.  
Id. at 4. 
 50. Id. at 13. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 13.  The consent approved related-party transactions with the service company—
totaling $42,032,060—and authorized management to conduct related-party transactions with the 
service company for the remainder of 2016.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 14. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  BDO began the audit on July 11, 2016, and, at the inquiry of Lewin on the company’s 
audit committee, reported no adverse findings.  Id. 
 56. Unlike the annual filing of the Form 10-K, the Form 10-Q is filed quarterly and consists of 
“unaudited financial statements” which provide “a continuing view of the company’s financial 
position during the year.”  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-Q, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-10-q (February 
10, 2021). 
 57. Hughes, slip op. at 15. 
 58. The company’s only reported related-party transactions were with the service company.  Id. 
at 15. 
 59. Id.  The Chinese government phased out the subsidy program in September 2016 after 
investigations showed that Chinese manufacturers had structured their operations in a way to receive 
subsidies for both producers and purchasers of electric vehicles.  Id. 
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2012.60  The company also disclosed additional related-party transactions—
totaling $10.4 million as of December 31, 2016—with the service company.61 
In March 2017, the company announced that financial statements 
between 2014 through the third quarter of 2016 “could not be relied upon and 
needed to be restated” (the “March 2017 Announcement”).62  The company 
committed to providing restatement financial statements.63  Shortly following 
the March 2017 Announcement, the company filed its Annual Report on 
Form 10-K for the 2016 calendar year.64  It disclosed that the company lacked 
both “sufficient expertise” in financial statement reporting techniques and 
“effective controls” to classify certain cash and non-cash activities 
properly.65 
3. Section 220 submission 
As a result of both the March 2017 Announcement and 2016 10-K, on 
May 10, 2017, Hughes sought to inspect the company’s books and records.66  
After the company initially declined to respond, Hughes filed for compliance 
in the Delaware Chancery Court.67  After protracted negotiations, the 
company’s board of directors provided some documents.68  However, the 
company stipulated that any remaining requested materials “either do not 
exist or had been withheld on privilege grounds.”69 
 
 60. Id. at 16.  The company claimed that these transactions were conducted at “arm’s length.”  
Id.  An arm’s-length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties,” 
or “[a] transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the 
parties were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.”  Transaction, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 61. Hughes, slip op. at 16. 
 62. Id.  After the company made the March 2017 Announcement, four securities class actions 
and one derivative lawsuit were filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.  In re Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 17 Civ. 1944 (ER), 2019 WL 4918649, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019); Hughes, slip op. at 18.  The district court dismissed the securities class 
actions holding that the plaintiffs did not plead sufficiently particular facts that would support the 
required strong inference of scienter.  In re Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 4918649, 
at *3–6. 
 63. Hughes, slip op. at 16. 
 64. Id. at 17. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 17–18; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2020). 
 67. Hughes, slip op. at 18. 
 68. Id. at 3, 18.  
 69. Id. at 3 (quoting Hughes v. Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0700-JTL, Dkt. 24, 
Stipulation of Dismissal With Prejudice, at 2). 
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C. Procedural History of Current Litigation 
On February 14, 2019, Hughes filed suit in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, alleging that the defendants “individually and collectively, 
breached their fiduciary duties by willfully failing to maintain an adequate 
system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and internal controls 
over financial reporting.”70  Hughes also alleged that the defendants were 
unjustly enriched by receiving bonuses tied to the inaccurate financial 
reporting.71  The defendants denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the 
complaint under Court of Chancery rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6).72  On April 27, 
the court denied the defendants’ motions for dismissal, permitting the case to 
move forward.73  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
“Caremark claims” are a subset of shareholder derivative suits available 
under Delaware law.74  Caremark claims allow shareholders, on behalf of the 
corporation, to bring action against directors who either failed to implement 
or properly monitor systems of oversight.75  Section II.A discusses the origins 
and requirements of shareholder derivative suits under Delaware law.76  
Should shareholders decide that demand[ing] the board to act—a requirement 
for shareholder derivative suits—would be futile, the shareholders must plead 
why the court should excuse this requirement.77  Section II.B reviews the 
current tests that Delaware courts use to evaluate “demand futility.”78  
Section II.C examines the foundation and evolution of Caremark claims.79  
Section II.D surveys Delaware courts’ current jurisprudence of Caremark 
claims.80 
 
 70. Id. at 18–19. 
 71. Id. at 19. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 40. 
 74. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing how a “failure to act in good 
faith” can in turn lead to a company’s director violating their duty of loyalty); Louisiana Mun. Police 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“A breach of fiduciary duty claim that 
seeks to hold directors accountable for the consequences of a corporate trauma is known colloquially 
as a Caremark claim . . . .”). 
 75. Hughes, slip op. at 1, 21, 29–31. 
 76. See infra Section II.A. 
 77. See e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932–34 (Del. 1993) (describing the demand 
requirement and under what circumstances it can be excused). 
 78. See infra Section II.B. 
 79. See infra Section II.C. 
 80. See infra Section II.D. 
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A. Shareholder Derivative Suits 
Under Delaware corporation law, a company is managed by its duly 
elected board of directors.81  While the directors are responsible for the 
corporation’s affairs, shareholders are not left powerless to address 
transgressions made by the board against the corporation.82  However, a 
shareholder’s ability to bring derivative suits is restricted by several 
procedural requirements.83  Section II.A.1 details the history and creation of 
shareholder derivative suits.84  Section II.A.2 discusses the various “standing 
requirements” that shareholders must overcome before they can bring a 
shareholder derivative suit.85 
1. Origin of Derivative Suits 
Under longstanding American jurisprudence, “[c]orporations are 
creatures of state law, and . . . state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”86  Delaware’s corporation law—of which Kandi is bound by 
because it is incorporated in Delaware87—provides that shareholders elect the 
company’s board of directors88 to manage the corporation’s affairs in the 
shareholders’ stead.89  The practical effect of this arrangement is the 
separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (directors)—which in 
turn allows for more traditional corporate characteristics such as limited 
liability.90  This exchange in power has additional consequences for 
directors.91  Directors gain a “triad” of fiduciary duties aimed at protecting 
both the interests of the corporation and the best interests of its 
 
 81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142(a), 211(b) (2020). 
 82. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 83. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 84. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 85. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 86. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort. v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 
(1975)). 
 87. Hughes, slip op. at 1. 
 88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020).  
 89. Id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”).  Actual day-to-day 
management of the corporation is typically done by a selection of officers by the board.  Id. § 142(a).  
 90. See Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA, 72 
WASH. U. L. Q. 223, 233 n.43 (1994) (discussing the corporate form and how the corporation is a 
“separate and distinct” entity from its shareholders). 
 91. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The existence and exercise of this 
power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders.” (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). 
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shareholders.92  Delaware courts have extrapolated from these fiduciary 
duties a presumption that directors’ business decisions must be made on both 
an informed and “good faith” basis.93  This presumption is called the 
“business judgment rule,” which functionally serves as a powerful defense 
when directors’ business decisions are questioned by shareholders.94 
Shareholders primarily exercise control over directors’ actions through 
their power to elect, retain, and remove the company’s directors;95 however, 
shareholders are not powerless when directors’ actions harm the 
corporation.96  Through shareholder derivative suits, shareholders have the 
codified right to try and bring actions on behalf of the corporation itself.97  
However, shareholders of Delaware incorporated companies must overcome 
several arduous common law and statutory procedural requirements to pursue 
such a remedy.98  
 
 92. Compare Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (stating that the three 
fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of good faith), with Stone v. 
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an 
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”). 
 93. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (“[P]resumption that in making a business decision, the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.” (quoting Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 812)). 
 94. Id. at 361 (“The rule posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors 
in that a decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts unless it 
cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))). 
 95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020).  Under Delaware law, shareholders are also 
permitted to vote on matters such as the approval of charter or by-law amendments.  Id. § 109(a).  
 96. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. 
 97. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454–59 (1882) (discussing the early English and 
American case law regarding shareholder derivative suits).  The nature of these suits are either “the 
equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue” or “a suit by the 
corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.”  Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 811.  Shareholder derivative suits are inherently incongruent with the notion that directors 
are empowered to manage the business and affairs of the corporation and, as such, a shareholder’s 
right to seek such a remedy is limited to two situations: “(i) the stockholder has demanded that the 
directors pursue the corporate claim and they have wrongfully refused to do so or (ii) demand is 
excused because the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the 
litigation.”  Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (citing 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993)).  Federal and state governments, including 
Delaware, have codified the shareholders’ power to seek derivative actions.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.; 
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
 98. See infra Sections II.A.2., II.B. 
  
2021] HUGHES V. HU 1257 
 
2. Standing Requirements for Shareholder Derivative Suits under 
Delaware Corporation Law 
To prevail in a shareholder derivative suit, a shareholder must first show 
that they were a shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction(s).99  
The shareholder must also maintain ownership throughout the litigation.100  
Second, the shareholder must show that their action adequately represents the 
corporation’s interest and fellow shareholders.101  The third and final 
procedural hurdle that shareholders must overcome is the demand 
requirement.102   
Upon receiving the shareholder demand, the board can choose to file the 
suit itself—resolving the matter—or to reject the demand.103  However, a 
rejected demand does not waste the shareholder’s single “arrow.”104  If the 
shareholder can convince the court that the board wrongly rejected their 
demand,105 the shareholder maintains “the right to bring the underlying 
action.”106  In Delaware, shareholders can also overcome the demand 
 
 99. This requirement of share ownership is found both in the Delaware Court of Chancery rules 
as well as codified in the Delaware General Corporation law, with near identical language.  DEL. 
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327.  Delaware, unlike some states, do not require a 
minimum ownership stake in order to bring a derivative suit.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
7-107-402(3) (2021) (allowing for a shareholder owning less than a prescribed amount of stock to 
post bond); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (2020) (allowing the same). 
 100. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004). 
 101. Id. at 1036–39.  Delaware law categorizes shareholder cases based on “where the recovery 
. . . flows”: direct or derivative.  Id. at 1036.  The cases are separated by a two-question inquiry.  
First, “who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually)?”  Id. 
at 1033.  Second, “who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation 
or the stockholders, individually)?”  Id.  Should the plaintiff-shareholder adequately show that the 
action is derivative in nature, the shareholder bringing the suit must submit an affidavit disclaiming 
that they have not, nor will they, receive any benefit from serving as the representative party.  DEL. 
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a)–(b). 
 102. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable 
authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”).  
The demand requirement seeks to maintain a fundamental precept of Delaware corporation law—
that directors, not shareholders, run the company—by requiring shareholders to first exhaust their 
“intracorporate remedies.”  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12. 
 103. In re infoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 985–86 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 104. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Del. 1996) (“If a demand is made, the 
stockholder has spent one—but only one—’arrow’ in the ‘quiver.’  The spent ‘arrow’ is the right to 
claim that demand is excused.  The stockholder does not, by making demand, waive the right to 
claim that demand has been wrongfully refused.”). 
 105. See infra Section II.B. 
 106. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219. 
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requirement by showing that their demand on the board would be futile, 
otherwise known as “demand futility.”107 
B. Overcoming the Demand Rule (“Demand Futility”)  
Although Delaware courts are deferential to directors’ business 
judgments,108 they are also cognizant that external influence 
“sterilizes . . . discretion” and prevents directors from being considered 
“proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.”109  As 
such, two fact-specific110 inquiries—based on separate but related factual 
scenarios—have arisen in Delaware corporate jurisprudence to determine if 
demand is futile.111  These two inquiries are known as the Aronson112 and 
Rales113 tests, respectively. 
1. When the Current and Challenged Board is the Same  
In the seminal case, Aronson v. Lewis,114 the Delaware Supreme Court 
considered a situation where the directors who approved the challenged 
transaction were the same directors who would consider a demand.115  The 
court devised a two-pronged test specifically for this factual situation.116  The 
first prong of the Aronson test examines “the independence and 
disinterestedness of the directors,”117 while the second prong reviews the 
 
 107. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (“The rule emerging from these decisions is that where officers 
and directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered 
proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.  Thus, demand would be futile.”). 
 108. See id. at 812 (“Absent an abuse of discretion, that [‘business’] judgment will be respected 
by the courts.”). 
 109. Id. at 814.  But see id. at 815. (“[T]he mere threat of personal liability for approving a 
questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the independence or 
disinterestedness of directors . . . .”). 
 110. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008).  Delaware courts routinely express that 
when considering a demand’s futility, any reasonable inference draw in the plaintiff-shareholder’s 
favor must be drawn from “particularized facts” and “inferences that are not objectively reasonable 
cannot be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.”  See id. (citing Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004)). 
 111. Id.  
 112. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 113. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 114. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 115. Id. at 808–12; Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 22–23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 
2020). 
 116. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 
 117. Id.  The court went on to say that should there be an “‘interested’ director transaction, such 
that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction, then 
the inquiry ceases.”  Id. at 815.  Under such circumstances—not being under the protection of the 
business judgment rule—directors face significant risk from the suit.  Id.; Hughes, slip op. at 23. 
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“alleged wrong . . . against the factual background alleged in the 
complaint.”118 
The court rejected the notion that:  
[A]ny board approval of a challenged transaction automatically 
connotes “hostile interest” and “guilty participation” by directors, 
or some other form of sterilizing influence upon them.  Were that 
so, the demand requirements of our law would be meaningless, 
leaving the clear mandate of Chancery Rule 23.1 devoid of its 
purpose and substance.119 
Moreover, the court held that the shareholders must establish 
“reasonable doubt,” by the allegation of “particularized facts,” in both the 
notion that the directors were ”disinterested and independent”120 and that the 
“challenged transaction was . . . a valid exercise of business judgment.”121   
2. When the Board has Changed after the Challenged Conduct  
Because the Aronson test covered a factually specific situation,122 it did 
not transpose well to cases where the “board had not acted or where the 
board’s membership had changed.”123  As such, in Rales v. Blasband,124 the 
Delaware Supreme Court readdressed the demand futility question where 
“the test enunciated in [Aronson] is not implicated.”125  In Rales, the board 
that considered the demand was not the same board that had made the 
 
 118. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Directors are considered “interested” when they will receive a personal benefit from a 
transaction, and the shareholders do not equally benefit.  Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 
1993).  Directors can also be “interested” where they are not independent of someone whom is 
“interested” in the challenged transaction.  Hughes, slip op. at 25–26. 
 121. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  The Hughes court put it succinctly, “[t]he central legal question 
was therefore whether the complaint’s allegations about the directors’ involvement in the decision 
to approve the challenged transaction rendered them incapable of making an impartial decision 
regarding whether to institute litigation concerning the transaction.”  Hughes, slip op. at 22. 
 122. See Hughes, slip op. at 24 (noting that the Aronson test only addressed situations where 
“the same board that would consider a demand had made the decision being challenged in the 
derivative suit”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
 125. Id. at 930 (emphasis added).  Although the court was explicit in saying that “a court should 
not apply the Aronson test for demand futility where the board that would be considering the demand 
did not make a business decision which is being challenged,” the court further elaborated the 
“principle scenarios” in which not to apply the Aronson test: (1) where a majority of the directors 
who made the challenged decision have been replaced; (2) the subject of the derivative suit is not a 
business decision of the board; and (3) where the challenged decision was made by the board of a 
different corporation.  Id. at 933–34. 
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underlying challenged decision.126  To address this issue, the court articulated 
a more comprehensive demand futility test:  
[W]hether or not the particularized factual allegations of a 
derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as 
of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have 
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business 
judgment in responding to a demand.  If the derivative plaintiff 
satisfies this burden, then demand will be excused as futile.127 
The court also explained a two-step process when a board responds to a 
stockholder demand letter.128  First, the directors must “determine the best 
method to inform themselves of the facts relating to the alleged wrongdoing 
and the considerations.”129  Next, the board must consider the “alternatives 
available to it, including the advisability of implementing internal corrective 
action and commencing legal proceedings.”130  
Delaware courts have noted that the Rales and Aronson tests essentially 
seek to accomplish the same task—determining directors’ impartiality.131  
However, Delaware courts have further expressed that while Rales is not a 
“universal demand requirement,”132 the more broadly articulated test does 
provide a “cleaner, more straightforward formulation to probe the core issue 
in the demand futility” analysis.133 
 
 126. Id. at 930–31. 
 127. Id. at 934 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 935.  This process must also be done “free of personal financial interest and improper 
extraneous influences.”  Id. 
 129. Id.  The court noted that should a factual investigation be required, it must be conducted 
“reasonably and in good faith.”  Id. (citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 213 (Del. 1991)); Spiegel 
v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990). 
 130. Rales, 634 A.2d at 935; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984) 
(discussing the role of the demand requirement as a “form of alternate dispute resolution” that 
requires the stockholder to exhaust “his intracorporate remedies”). 
 131. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 132. Sandys v. Pincus, C.A. No. 9512-CB, 2016 WL 769999, at *13 n.60 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 
2016), rev’d, 152 A.3d 124, 134 (Del. 2016) (reversing the chancery court’s dismissal under rule 
23.1 and remanding for further proceedings).  
 133. Id. at *13.  The court further elaborated that the core issue in demand futility analysis is, 
“whether there is a reason to doubt the impartial[ity] of the directors, who hold the authority under 
8 Del. C. § 141(a) to decide [for the corporation] whether to initiate, or refrain from entering, 
litigation.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teamsters Union 
25, 119 A.3d 44, 67 (Del. Ch. 2015)); see Hughes, slip op. at 26–27, 27 n.2 (claiming, and providing 
ample supporting case law, that the more broadly articulated Rales test “supersedes and 
encompasses” the more “special application” Aronson test). 
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C. The Duty of Oversight and “Caremark” Claims 
As noted above, shareholder derivative suits are a means under 
Delaware corporation law for shareholders to try and bring actions on behalf 
of the corporation itself when the board has violated one of its fiduciary 
duties.134  As such, the board is subject to various “standing” 
requirements135—one of which is the previously discussed “Demand 
Rule.”136  In situations where the plaintiff can show that their demand on the 
board would be futile, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit.137  One type 
of shareholder derivative suit—spawned from the broad’s duty of 
oversight—is the “Caremark claim.”138  Section II.C.1 discusses the history 
surrounding the creation of the duty of oversight and the subsequently created 
Caremark liability.139  Section II.C.2 details how the duty of oversight’s 
intellectual underpinnings have shifted over the years.140  Lastly, Section 
II.C.3 examines the specific parameters of the duty of oversight.141 
1. Acceptance of Caremark Liability  
Foundationally, directors are bound by specific fiduciary duties “to 
protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its 
shareholders.”142  Courts, acting as a proxy for societal expectations, have 
imposed additional duties on boards as views of corporate board 
responsibilities have morphed over time.143  The most prominent of these new 
duties is the aptly named “duty of oversight.”144  
In the seminal case In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation,145 the Delaware Court of Chancery accepted what the Graham v. 
 
 134. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 135. See supra Section II.A. 
 136. See supra Section II.B. 
 137. Hughes, slip op. at 21. 
 138. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing how a “failure to act in good 
faith” can in turn lead to a company’s director violating their duty of loyalty). 
 139. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 140. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 141. See infra Section II.C.3. 
 142. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).  The court further identified the three fiduciary duties: the duty of 
loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of good faith.  Id. at 361. 
 143. See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text.  See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, The 
Import of History to Corporate Law, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683, 688–92 (2015) (discussing the 
“revolution” during the 1970’s and 1980’s in director duties and responsibilities). 
 144. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).  While all 
referencing the same duty, the “duty of oversight” has been called by other names such as “duty to 
monitor.”  Mitchell, supra note 143, at 684. 
 145. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.146 court rejected thirty-three years 
earlier.147  Graham was a derivative suit against the company’s directors for 
damages caused by violations of federal antitrust laws.148  The court—
treating the case like a torts case149—found that the board’s activity was 
wholly limited to “matters concerning the general business policy of the 
company,” given that the company’s decentralized nature made board-level 
considerations of “specific problems” impracticable.150  In a final 
proclamation, the Graham court noted that “absent cause for suspicion there 
is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of 
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists.”151   
Thirty-three years later in In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery reevaluated Graham’s pronouncement on the board’s duty to 
establish systems of monitoring.152  Chancellor Allen elaborated that a “broad 
generalization” of Graham’s holding153 would not be accepted by the, then-
current, Delaware Supreme Court.154  Chancellor Allen noted that recent 
Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence155 demonstrated the “seriousness 
with which the corporation law views the role of the corporate board,”156 and 
that “relevant and timely information” was a necessary component to the 
 
 146. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 147. Compare In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 969–70 (discussing that directors have a duty 
to “assure that a corporate information gathering and reporting systems exists”), with Graham, 188 
A.2d at 130 (“[A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate 
a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists.”). 
 148. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127.  
 149. Id. at 130 (“[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use 
that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”); 
see Mitchell, supra note 143, at 683–84 (discussing that early duty of care cases had origins in torts). 
 150. Graham, 188 A.2d at 128. 
 151. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).  
 152. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 969–70. 
 153. Chancellor Allen stated the following: 
Can it be said today that, absent some ground giving rise to suspicion of violation of law, 
that corporate directors have no duty to assure that a corporate information gathering and 
reporting systems exists which represents a good faith attempt to provide senior 
management and the Board with information respecting material acts, events or 
conditions within the corporation, including compliance with applicable statutes and 
regulations? 
Id. at 969. 
 154. Id. at 969–70. 
 155. Id. at 970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).  
 156. Id.  
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board’s “supervisory and monitoring role” under Delaware Corporate law.157  
In total, these recent developments meant that for a board to “satisfy their 
obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation,” the board 
had an affirmative duty to ensure systematic monitoring.158  
Chancellor Allen’s final action was to find  a proper fiduciary home for 
this new duty of oversight.159  In a judicial two-step, Chancellor Allen noted 
that the board’s obligation of oversight was a “duty to attempt in good faith 
to assure that a . . . reporting system . . . [was] adequate,”160 and that the duty 
of good faith was a “core element of any . . . duty of care inquiry.”161  
However, Caremark did not overturn Graham, and therefore, Chancellor 
Allen’s extensive description of this new “duty of oversight” was almost 
entirely dicta.162  It would take another thirteen years for the duty articulated 
in Caremark to become law.163  The Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. 
Ritter164 set forth the two prongs that would become the basis for Caremark 
claims: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or 
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
 
 157. Id. (noting that “relevant and timely information” was required for the execution of the 
board’s “supervisory and monitoring role” under Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law.  Chancellor Allen also noted the federal organizational sentencing guidelines on business 
organizations were indicative of a duty of oversight.  Id. (“Any rational person attempting in good 
faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take into account this 
development and the enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”).  
See generally Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647, 
648 (2018) (discussing the 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ influence on the Caremark decision). 
 158. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 159. Id. at 968–70. 
 160. Id. at 970. 
 161. Id. at 968 (emphasis added).  Placing the duty of oversight within the duty of care meant 
that this new duty would be subject to the business judgment rule; therefore, as long as the board 
exercised “good faith” in establishing and running the newly required monitoring systems, the board 
would not be held “liable for [its] failure to reveal violations of law or duties by officers or 
employees.”  Mitchell, supra note 143, at 693.  The court elaborated on the level of detail such 
systems would require:  
Obviously[,] the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a 
question of business judgment.  And obviously too, no rationally designed information 
and reporting system will remove the possibility that the corporation will violate laws or 
regulations, or that senior officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or 
otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation’s compliance with the 
law. 
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970.  
 162. Graham was a decision from the Delaware Supreme Court, and as such, Chancellor Allen 
had no authority to overturn Graham.  Id. at 969.  See generally Todd Haugh, Caremark’s 
Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 616, 618 (stating that Chancellor Allen employed 
“extensive use of dicta to ‘author a mini-treatise’ on oversight liability”). 
 163. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006). 
 164. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
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disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring 
their attention.”165 
2. Shifting of the Duty of Oversight   
In the time between Caremark and Stone, the several intellectual 
underpinnings of the duty of oversight significantly changed.166  The duty of 
oversight’s ancestral home, as established in Caremark, was within the duty 
of care.167  But shortly before Caremark’s acceptance in Stone, the Delaware 
Supreme Court—based on the “plain and intentional terms” of Caremark—
moved the duty of oversight within the duty of loyalty.168  This Guttman v. 
Huang169 articulation of the duty of oversight’s home is what the Stone court 
accepts verbatim.170  
The underlying requirement to “act in good faith” followed the duty of 
oversight’s move to its new home within the duty to loyalty.171  Yet the court 
did not further define the duty to act in good faith.172  The Delaware Supreme 
Court in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation173 provided the 
“conceptual guidance” as to the meaning of “good faith” in the corporate 
context.174  Specifically, the court observed that there are at least three 
categories of good faith.175  All three categories require the fiduciary to either 
act intentionally without the corporation’s best interests in mind or to 
 
 165. Id. at 370. 
 166. See infra notes 168–177 and accompanying text. 
 167. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 168. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. 2003) (“Although the Caremark decision is 
rightly seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care . . . its plain and intentional 
terms . . . articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight . . . that the directors breached 
their duty of loyalty . . . .”).  
 169. 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 170. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34). 
 171. Id. at 369–70 (calling the requirement to act in good faith “‘a subsidiary element’ . . . ’of 
the fundamental duty of loyalty’”) (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34).  In Caremark, the court 
famously said that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition.”  In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 
971. 
 172. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 971; see Mitchell, supra note 143, at 697–99 (discussing 
that by “reintroduc[ing]” the concept of good faith,” the Delaware courts then had the task of 
defining it). 
 173. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 174. Id. at 64–65. 
 175. Id. at 67.  The first category is “where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other 
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”  Id.  The second occurs “where the 
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law.”  Id.  The third occurs “where the 
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties.”  Id.   
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disregard their duties.176  Similar to Stone’s incorporation of Guttman, Stone 
incorporated Walt Disney’s definitions of good faith177 into its final 
articulation of the duty of oversight.178 
3. Business Risk vs. Legal Risk  
Three years after the acceptance of Caremark claims in Stone, the 
Delaware Chancery Court gave additional guidance on the duty of 
oversight’s parameters.179  In In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation,180 shareholders claimed that the board breached its fiduciary 
duties by failing to monitor the potential risk, which resulted in significant 
losses arising from the company’s exposure to the subprime lending 
market.181  Ultimately, the Citigroup court found that the losses were a result 
of  “business risk.”182  Therefore the business judgment rule would shield the 
directors unless the shareholders could show that the directors were acting 
without “good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”183  The court noted that—to grant the kind of 
“judicial second guessing” the plaintiffs were asking for—it would have to 
“abandon such bedrock principles of Delaware fiduciary duty law.”184   
Regarding the plaintiff’s complaint, Chancellor Chandler stated in the 
opinion that the “[p]laintiffs’ theory . . . [was] a bit of a twist on the traditional 
Caremark claim.185  Moreover, Chancellor Chandler sharply noted that there 
is a “significant difference[] between failing to oversee employee fraudulent 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. The Stone court referred to “good faith” by articulating it in the negative.  Stone v. Ritter, 
911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).  The Stone court invoked the second definition of bad faith in Walt 
Disney.  Id. at 369–70.  See generally Ann M. Scarlett, Imitation or Improvement? The Evolution 
of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, 
28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 569, 589 (2011) (discussing Stone’s interpretation and 
incorporation of good faith in the newly accepted duty of oversight). 
 178. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70. 
 179. See infra notes 180–188 and accompanying text. 
 180. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 181. Id. at 111. 
 182. Id. at 123–25. 
 183. Id. at 124–25.  In a particularly damning excerpt, the court stated that “[w]hen one looks 
past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and red flags used to dress up these claims, what is 
left appears to be plaintiff shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants personally liable 
for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly.”  Id. at 
124.  The court opined that “[i]t is almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether 
the directors of a company properly evaluated risk” and that “[i]n any investment there is a chance 
that returns will turn out lower than expected.”  Id. at 126. 
 184. Id. at 126. 
 185. Id. at 123 (“In a typical Caremark case, plaintiffs argue that the defendants are liable for 
damages that arise from a failure to properly monitor or oversee employee misconduct or violations 
of law.”). 
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or criminal conduct [“legal risk”] and failing to recognize the extent of a 
Company’s business risk.186  The Citigroup decision not only reaffirmed that 
cases of “business risk” are exceedingly difficult to prosecute under 
Caremark jurisprudence,187 but also seemingly narrowed the scope of 
Caremark claims to only those involving “legal risk.”188 
D. Current “loosening” of “Caremark” Claims 
In the seminal Caremark case, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that 
its newly created theory was “possibly the most difficult theory in 
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”189  
Since the acceptance of Caremark claims in Stone,190 this prophetic 
pronouncement has mostly been accurate, with the majority of cases resolved 
through summary judgment in favor of the directors.191  However, in recent 
years the Delaware Chancery Court appears to be increasing the 
“survivability” of Caremark claims.192  
This trend in increased “survivability” began a year before Hughes v. 
Hu,193 as the Delaware Courts began to consider the potential inferences that 
could be drawn when a board does not adequately oversee industry specific 
compliance risks.194  In Marchand v. Barnhill195—the first case in this 
increased “survivability” trend—the Delaware Supreme Court held that when 
a board fails to inform itself of “compliance issue[s] intrinsically critical to 
 
 186. Id. at 131 (“While it may be tempting to say that directors have the same duties to 
monitor and oversee business risk, imposing Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor 
business risk is fundamentally different.”).  
 187. Id. (“Oversight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors . . . to 
personal liability for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”) 
 188. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872, at *17 (Del. 
Ch. June 26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016) (“Pleadings, even specific pleadings, indicating 
that directors did a poor job of overseeing risk in a poorly-managed corporation do not imply 
director bad faith.”); In re Dow Chem. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *9–10 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (affirming Citigroup’s strict approach to oversight liability). 
 189. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 190. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 191. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(failing to survive a motion to dismiss by defendants).  But see, e.g., In re China Agritech, Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) 
(surviving motion to dismiss brought by defendants).  See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate 
Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2036–37, 2045 (2019) (describing that the 
low survival rate of these cases are due to some combination of the exacting pleading requirements 
and low standard for “good faith” oversight). 
 192. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.  
 193. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 194. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text. 
 195. 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) vacated, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018) 
(missing plaintiffs’ Caremark claims). 
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the company’s business operation” it is proper to make an inference of bad 
faith by the board.196  Furthermore, the court stressed that while the board can 
rely on management,197 the duty of oversight means that (at a minimum) the 
board must “exercise its duty of care” in creating systems of monitoring and 
reporting on “the corporation’s central compliance risks.”198   
Just a few months later, in In re Clovis, Inc. Derivative Litigation,199 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery refined Marchand’s notion of “‘mission 
critical’ . . . risk”200 to include the “regulatory environments in which their 
businesses operate,” particularly, impositions created by “positive law.”201  
The In re Clovis court’s “expansion“ of Caremark liability still incorporates 
the protections of the business judgment rule202 while limiting the board’s 
discretion concerning regulatory mandates.203  The court noted that although 
a “board’s oversight function must be more rigorously exercised” when the 
“company operates in an environment [with] externally imposed 
regulations,” that oversight need not be “omniscien[t]” but rather a “good 
faith effort.”204 
The court also touched on the notion that although managers run the 
day-to-day operations of corporations—and therefore are presumably more 
knowledgeable about on-the-ground matters—management cannot solely be 
left to handle “mission critical” regulatory mandates.205  Despite more 
 
 196. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822 (emphasis added). 
 197. In Gantler v. Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, explicitly 
held that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors.  965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 
2009). 
 198. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added).  In Marchand, management had 
been getting reports about a growing listeria presence in company plants; however, board minutes 
show “no report or discussion of the increasingly frequent positive tests that had been occurring.”  
Id. at 812.  Other documents showed that for over two years, the board remained unaware of the 
growing problem, except for a positive report from the company’s third-party auditor for sanitation.  
Id. at 813.  The first board-level discussion occurred two days after a limited recall.  Id. at 812–14. 
 199. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
 200. Id. at *12–13 (citing Marchand extensively). 
 201. Id. at *12.  The court stressed that they were not expecting “omniscience” by the board but 
simply evidence of good faith efforts.  Id. at *13. 
 202. Id. at *12–13.  
 203. See id. at *12 (“[T]he legal academy has observed that Delaware courts are more inclined 
to find Caremark oversight liability at the board level when the company operates in the midst of 
obligations imposed upon it by positive law yet fails to implement compliance systems,or fails to 
monitor existing compliance systems . . . .” (citing In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., 2019 WL 
2320842, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019))). 
 204. Id. at *13 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821, 824). 
 205. Id. at *12–13 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823–24 (Del. 2019)).  The court effectively 
accounted that the board itself must play a role in “implementing and then overseeing a more 
structured compliance system.”  Id. at *12 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823–24). 
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Caremark claims surviving motions to dismiss, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery remains steadfast to the strict underlying pleading requirements of 
Chancery rule 23.1206 that Caremark claims require.207 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
A. The Court’s Holding  
Writing for the court, Vice Chancellor Laster held that Hughes 
successfully presented a set of particularized facts supporting his allegation 
that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by failing to maintain a 
board-level system for monitoring the company’s financial reporting.208  
Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss under  Court 
of Chancery rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6).209  
B. “Demand Futility” Analysis 
The court first discussed the proper analytical standard for this case.210  
Because Hughes sought to bypass the board and directly move forward with 
the litigation on the company’s behalf, the court noted that he first needed to 
seek excusal from making a demand.211  The court noted that the Delaware 
Supreme Court created two tests to determine if a complaint had sufficiently 
pled demand futility: the Aronson212 and Rales213 tests.214  The court found 
 
 206. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 207. Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 817, 824 (Del. 2019) (surviving motion to dismiss) and 
Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 40 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (surviving motions 
to dismiss), with In re MetLife Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0452-SG, 2020 WL 4746635, at *12–14 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 17, 2020) (stating that the pleadings were phrased too broadly), and In re GoPro, Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0784-JRS, 2020 WL 2036602, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 
2020) (stating that the “[p]laintiffs’’[c]omplaint is a model of . . . imprecision”). 
 208. Hughes, slip op. at 36–38.  
 209. Id. at 40.  
 210. Id. at 22–29 (discussing at length whether to use the Aronson or Rales test). 
 211. Id. at 21.  Normally, plaintiffs seeking to prosecute derivative suits are limited to situations 
where “(i) the stockholder has demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and they have 
wrongfully refused to do so or (ii) demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making 
an impartial decision regarding the litigation.”  Id. (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 
(Del. 1993)).  Therefore, to avoid first making a litigation demand, plaintiffs must allege “with 
particularity” their reasoning for not seeking a litigation demand.  Id.  The court in Hughes, 
determined that the facts of the case implicated the second situation.  Id. at 22. 
 212. Id. at 22–24.  See supra Section II.B.1 for more a detailed discussion of the Aronson test. 
 213. Id. at 25.  See supra Section II.B.2 for more a detailed discussion of the Rales test. 
 214. Hughes, slip op. at 22 (citing Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008)).  A critical 
distinction between the tests is the board’s composition at both the time of the challenged decision 
and the consideration of the demand.  Id. at 22–24.  The Aronson test considers a situation where 
the board is the same at both time points, while the Rales test—due to its more comprehensive 
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that the complaint against the defendants was not “framed” as an Aronson-
style lawsuit—challenging either a specific transaction or particular 
decision—but rather a more general challenge to the company’s persistent 
problems.215  As such, the court applied the more generalized Rales 
standard.216 
C. The Caremark Claim  
The court began by addressing the first claim,217 which alleged that the 
defendants “breached their fiduciary duties by willfully failing to maintain 
an adequate system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and 
internal controls over financial reporting.”218  The court found that the 
plaintiff adequately demonstrated that the board of directors—acting through 
the audit committee—showed “bad faith conduct” by failing to implement 
and monitor meaningful systems and controls for corporate oversight.219  The 
court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that since the company did not 
suffer harm, the defendants should not be subject to liability.220  As such, the 
directors faced a substantial threat of liability under both Caremark claim 
paths, and the motion to dismiss as to Count I under rule 23.1 was denied.221  
 
nature—considers only the board’s ability to consider the demand when the complaint was filed.  
Id.  
 215. Id. at 28–29.  Moreover, the court held that the central theory of the complaint was a duty 
of oversight claim.  Id. at 28.  The court regarded this duty—otherwise referred to as a Caremark 
claim—as outflowing from a company’s directors’ failure to act in protection of the corporation.  
Id. at 28–29. 
 216. Id. at 29. 
 217. There was a second asserted claim for unjust enrichment.  Id. at 38.  However, the court 
quickly determined that because the analysis of the second claim (“Count II”) “treads the same path 
as the demand futility analysis for Count I,” it implicates the same conduct and, as such, the demand 
is futile.  Id. at 39.  Therefore, this claim will not be discussed further.  
 218. Id. at 29. 
 219. Id. at 2, 34, 36–38.  “For both potential sources, ‘a showing of bad faith conduct . . . is 
essential to establish director oversight liability.’”  Id. at 30 (alteration in original) (quoting Stone 
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)).  
 220. Id. at 37.  Defendants argued that there was no effect on net income and, as such, there was 
no “harm.”  Id.  The court noted that “Delaware law dictates that the scope of recovery for a breach 
of the duty of loyalty is not to be determined narrowly,” and that the cost of restatements, harm to 
reputation, and defense of several lawsuits amounts to “harm.”  Id. at 37 (quoting Thorpe ex rel. 
Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996)). 
 221. Id. at 31, 34, 37–38.  “Directors face a substantial threat of liability under Caremark if ‘(a) 
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) 
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its 
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.’”  Id. at 30 (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).  The court also noted that the pleading under 
rule 23.1 was more stringent than under rule 12(b)(6) and, as such, held that a “complaint that 
survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to [r]ule 23.1 will also survive a [rule] 12(b)(6) motion to 
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IV. ANALYSIS  
In Hughes v. Hu,222 the Delaware Chancery Court correctly held that the 
Kandi board of directors faced a substantial threat of liability under the duty 
of oversight and therefore denied the directors’ motion to dismiss.223  Section 
IV.A discusses why the court correctly decided Hughes.224  Section IV.B 
considers why the Hughes holding will likely exacerbate the current trend of 
foreign-based corporations disfavoring Delaware as their corporate 
governance law source.225  Finally, Section IV.C explains why Delaware 
courts should consider a corporation’s principal business market when 
determining potential Caremark liability and therefore make “territorial 
adjustments” in determining the acceptable level of oversight.226 
A. The Delaware Chancery Court’s Holding is Consistent with 
Precedent  
The Hughes court correctly applied the Rales test when it determined 
demand futility for two reasons: (1) the nature of the complaint itself and (2) 
the Hughes court’s position was consistent with recent precedent regarding 
the situational applicability of the demand futility tests.227  The Delaware 
Chancery Court also correctly rejected Kandi’s claims that its oversight 
efforts were sufficient to meet its Caremark burden by reasonably inferring 
from the plaintiff’s particularized facts—and grounded in prior precedent—
that the board failed to provide meaningful oversight. 228   
1. The Court’s Use of the Rales Test in Determining Demand Futility 
is Consistent with the Nature of the Complaint and Precedent  
The Delaware Chancery Court spent a considerable amount of time 
determining the applicable demand futility test to apply to the facts at hand.229  
Ultimately, the court determined the correct test by focusing on the alleged 
 
dismiss, assuming that it otherwise contains sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim.”  Id. at 39–
40 (quoting In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 222. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 223. Id. at 37–38. 
 224. See infra Section IV.A. 
 225. See infra Section IV.B. 
 226. See infra Section IV.C. 
 227. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 228. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 229. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 22–29 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
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challenged actions230 rather than the board’s composition.231  The court noted 
that the complaint was not alleging an “Aronson-style” suit—where the 
plaintiff was challenging a specific transaction or a particular decision—but 
rather was alleging that the harm caused by the directors’ lack of financial 
oversight was a chronic issue.232  This framing of chronic versus acute harm 
closely matches a core philosophical underpinning of Caremark liability—
that “oversight” implies actions over time and not a specific action in time.233  
The court’s holistic analysis in selecting the Rales test over the Aronson test 
further solidifies the court’s reluctance to be dogmatically bound by factual 
technicalities in determining the applicable demand futility test.234  
2. The Court’s Caremark Liability Holding is Consistent with Recent 
Precedent 
Caremark’s core principle is that directors are liable if they failed to 
create or maintain board-level information-gathering systems.235  While the 
bar of effort needed to satisfy this basic principle is not excruciatingly high,236 
 
 230. Id. at 28–29. 
 231. Id.  The court openly admitted that the board composition alone should lead to an Aronson 
analysis.  Id. at 28 (“Technically, because less than ‘a majority of the directors making the decision 
have been replaced’ . . . Aronson would govern.” (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)).  
Id.  
 232. Id. at 28–29. 
 233. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822–24 (Del. 2019) (noting that the boards 
continual “lack of efforts” to ensure some form of oversight lead to a liability under Caremark); see 
also Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008) (“The . . . (Rales) test applies where the subject 
of a derivative suit is not a business decision of the Board but rather a violation of the Board’s 
oversight duties.”) (emphasis added). 
 234. Hughes, slip op. at 29 n.3 (citing eleven cases since 2017 where Delaware courts have held 
that the Rales test was applied for demand futility to director oversight claims).  Some commentators 
have noted this preference towards the conceptually broader Rales test.  DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & 
MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF 
CHANCERY § 11.03(c)(4)(ii) (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2nd ed. 2020) (“[O]ne might argue that 
the current state of this area of the law is conceptually inverted . . . . Indeed, recent decisional law 
seems to be trending incrementally toward a recognition of and preference for the more efficient 
utility of the Rales analysis.”). 
 235. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[C]orporate 
boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without 
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist . . . that are reasonably designed 
to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to 
allow . . . the board . . . to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance 
with law and its business performance.”); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (observing 
that directors face liability under Caremark if: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any 
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”). 
 236. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872, at *15 (Del. 
Ch. June 26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016) (holding that that by having “some oversight,” 
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the bottom-line effort is a showing of “good faith” by the directors.237  
Therefore companies facing Caremark liability routinely and successfully 
argue that their “good faith” attempts in taking “some” efforts to address their 
“risks”238 shields them from Caremark liability.239  Yet, Delaware courts 
have found that minimal efforts by boards to implement meaningful controls 
are not a panacea to avoid liability.240  
Shareholders face an uphill statutory climb241 in convincing the courts 
to reject the companies pleading of “good faith.”242  They must show, using 
“particularized facts,” that the board-level controls were virtually 
meaningless.243  But the court’s holding that the board faced a “substantial 
likelihood of liability under Caremark” extends a recent trend of cases where 
the Chancery Court has rejected pleadings of “good faith” by more readily 
accepting reasonable inferences drawn from the plaintiff’s well-plead 
“particularized facts.”244  
 
albeit not detailed enough to bring to the board’s attention the specific issue, can defeat arguments 
that the board “should have . . . had a better reporting system.”).  
 237. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821. 
 238. While the term “risks” is relatively all-encompassing unto itself, Delaware courts have 
narrowed the scope of applicable “risks” that boards must “make themselves aware of” to mean 
mostly “legal risks.”  See supra Section II.C.3.  “Business risks” are generally covered by the 
business judgment rule.  Id.   
 239. In re Gen. Motors Co., 2015 WL 395872, at *15. 
 240. See, e.g., Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(concluding that despite the existence of an audit committee and independent auditor, the company 
“had no meaningful controls in place”). 
 241. The Delaware Chancery Court is bound by the heightened pleading requirements of rule 
23.1 where “conclusionary [sic] allegations of fact or law not supported by the allegations of specific 
fact may not be taken as true.”  Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) rev’d on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a). 
 242. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 243. Id. at 21 (“But once a plaintiff pleads particularized allegations, then the plaintiff is entitled 
to all ‘reasonable inferences [that] logically flow from particularized facts alleged by the plaintiff.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 
845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004))). 
 244. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, 
at *1, *10, *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019).  These 
cases have prompted significant debate within the legal community about the difficulty of pleading 
a Caremark case.  E.g., Stephanie C. Evans & Alan J. Wilson, Another Reminder from Delaware 
About the Duty of Oversight, WILMERHALE (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/blogs/focus-on-audit-committees-accounting-and-the-
law/20191028-another-reminder-from-delaware-about-the-duty-of-oversight.  Some practitioners 
do not read these cases as lowering Caremark’s pleading difficulty since the cases must still 
withstand later litigation phases.  Id.  Rather, these cases show a greater acceptance by the Delaware 
Chancery Court in making reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor during the initial litigation 
phases.  Id.  It is worth noting that the defendants in Marchand and In re Clovis—the two Caremark 
cases to survive motions to dismiss immediately before Hughes—were monoline businesses.  Id.  
Kandi, on the other hand, operates in the wider electric vehicle market and produces a range of 
products.  KNDI: NASDAQ GS Stock Quote, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2021, 10:12 AM), 
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B. The Court’s Holding Will Exacerbate Foreign Companies’ 
Avoidance of Delaware Corporation Law  
Delaware has long been heralded as the “de facto national corporate 
law[maker]” and the gold standard for corporate governance law.245  This 
praise is not unjustly warranted, as Delaware has a triumvirate of business-
friendly entities: courts with judges experienced in corporation law, a 
legislature attentive to business needs, and interested local groups.246  
However, recent avoidance by foreign-based firms has led some scholars to 
question Delaware’s global prominence as the premier purveyor of corporate 
governance law.247  For over twenty years, foreign corporations listed on 
American stock exchanges have dramatically shifted from incorporating in 
Delaware to incorporating in foreign nations.248  This shift is paradoxical 
given both the rise of foreign corporations accessing American capital 
markets249 and the presumption that company managers select incorporation 
locations that investors view positively.250  While this drift is plausibly 
 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/KNDI:US.  Logically, monoline businesses are the simplest 
form of producers and therefore, risks in monoline businesses should be more apparent than other 
companies that delve into a larger number of products.  The oversight standards announced in 
Marchand—and reinforced in In re Clovis—thus should be more stringent than multi-product or 
multi-field companies.  However, this potential distinction in potential oversight standards for 
monoline and multi-line businesses is yet to be analyzed.  
 245. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005) (noting that Delaware “has long been viewed as the de facto 
national corporate law”); Goshen, supra note 18, at 426 (“Delaware . . . is widely recognized as the 
most significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes . . . .”). 
 246. William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1435, 1437–38 
(2020). 
 247. William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 27–35) (on file with author) (providing a detailed review of several potential 
explanations for Delaware’s weakness in competing for foreign-based firms).  
 248. Moon, supra note 247, at 20 tbl.1 (showing that between 1985 and 2016 the ratio of 
Delaware to foreign-nation incorporation of American-listed foreign corporations shifted from 
roughly 2:1 to 1:5). 
 249. Stephen Grocer, Chinese Companies Flocked to U.S. Markets in 2018. The Trade War May 
Have Had a Role, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/dealbook/trade-war-china-ipos.html; Evelyn 
Cheng, Chinese Companies Are Leading the Global IPO Rush Amid a ‘Flight from Uncertainty’, 
CNBC (Oct. 27, 2020, 12:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/27/chinese-companies-are-
leading-the-global-ipo-rush-amid-a-flight-from-uncertainty.html. 
 250. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1420 (1989) (“The managers who pick the state of incorporation that is most desirable from 
the perspective of investors will attract the most money.”); Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law 
as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 866 (2014) (stating that “a firm 
wishing to attract investors from around the country may choose Delaware merely to provide a law 
that can be ‘spoken’ by all of its investors”). 
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attributed to tax reduction objectives,251 this idea misses an essential factor 
foreign-based firms consider: local business environments.252 
Many foreign corporations only interact with the United States to access 
the world’s largest capital markets and potentially opt into some available 
corporate governance rules.253  Therefore, many of these foreign corporations 
conduct the vast majority of their business within their local, foreign 
markets.254  These local markets can differ significantly from the general 
American market.255  The differences in markets can lead to operational 
incompatibility between Delaware’s corporate governance laws and local 
practices.256  The Hughes holding both demonstrates the potential legal issues 
that can arise from operational incompatibility and provides a potential 
warning to managers of foreign companies that Delaware courts do not 
understand—or more accurately, do not account for—their particular 
business environments in litigation matters.257  
The primary operational incompatibility apparent in Hughes was the 
corporate structure and governance style of Kandi.258  Similar to several other 
U.S.-listed Chinese companies, Kandi is roughly structured as a corporate 
group.259  These corporate groups routinely conduct intra-group transactions 
 
 251. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276 (2010) (“In some 
circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes by choosing a tax haven or tax-friendly 
jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the standpoint of corporate law.”); Moon, 
supra note 246, at 1407 n.17, 1454 (providing an example of the tax implications of moving the 
location of incorporation from an American state to a tax haven). 
 252. See infra notes 253–256 and accompanying text.  
 253. Kandi Technologies Group is a perfect example.  The company is publicly traded on the 
NASDAQ, incorporated in Delaware, but the majority of its business is in China.  Hughes v. Hu, 
C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020); Company Profile, KANDI GROUP, 
http://ir.kandigroup.com/profile (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).  As of 2016, the two primary states of 
incorporation for Chinese corporations listed in American stock markets were Delaware and 
Nevada.  Moon, supra note 247, at 22 tbl.2. 
 254. See, e.g., Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges, U.S.-CHINA 
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 1, 3, 8, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2020-10/Chinese_Companies_on_US_Stock_Exchanges_10-2020.pdf (Oct. 2, 2020) (listing 
several prominent Chinese companies, including Kandi, that are listed on U.S. exchanges but 
primarily do business in China).  
 255. Moon, supra note 247, at 50 (“That is, local market environments—shaped by an array of 
factors including government policies, regulatory laws, capital markets, business culture, and 
judicial infrastructure—affect the corporate law preferences of firms.”). 
 256. Moon, supra note 247, at 51–52. 
 257. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text. 
 258. See infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text. 
 259. The term “corporate group” is a nebulous term, but a key characteristic of corporate groups 
is common ownership.  Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity 
Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 886 (2012).  Corporate groups in China—as well as 
other regions of the world such as Latin America, and Continental Europe—are a well-known 
phenomenon.  Moon, supra note 247, at 39–40; Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, Trading 
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as a general means of economic efficiency.260  Therefore, Xiaoming Hu’s 
ownership of sizable portions261 of both the company and the contracting 
service company is not—situationally—abnormal.262  Vertical control is a 
relative rarity in the United States263 and “self-deals” commonly form the 
basis for shareholder derivative litigation.264  Therefore, the Hughes 
approach, in which the court did not consider how the challenged company 
typically conducts business, is problematic for foreign-based companies.265  
This approach potentially exposes foreign-based companies to massive 
future litigation costs.266  Put succinctly, “Delaware’s elaborate legal regime 
policing ‘self-dealing’ transactions clashes with China’s contemporary 
market dynamics, where firms operating as corporate groups routinely 
 
Favors Within Chinese Business Groups, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (2010) (“Most large 
Chinese firms belong[] to a business group . . . .”); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the 
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 697, 706 (2013) (“[B]usiness groups fostered by the political regime and deeply entwined with 
Chinese Communist Party leadership may be central to the developmental success of the regime.”). 
 260. The term “economic efficiency” should be construed in the broadest possible terms.  
Transactions within groups decrease the transaction capital costs and overcome external structural 
weaknesses such as weak contract enforcement by judicial entities and weak capital markets.  See 
Jens Dammann, Related Party Transactions and Intragroup Transactions, in THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 218, 218 (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds., 
2019); see generally Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China: Group Structure and Firm 
Performance in Business Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1709 (2009) (describing the economic 
effects of using a corporate group structure in China).  
 261. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (“Xiaoming 
Hu is the Company’s CEO and chairman of its board of directors.  He beneficially owns 28.4% of 
the Company.  He also owns 13% of the Service Company.”). 
 262. Ho, supra note 259, at 886. 
 263. See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 731–36 (2017) 
(detailing some of the historical concerns regarding vertical integration).  
 264. Moon, supra note 247, at 55 (“[T]he United States is fairly unique in the world, in terms of 
the relative lack of self-dealing transactions and corporate groups.”). 
 265. Related Party Transactions Minority Shareholder and Rights, OECD 9 (2012), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50089215.pdf (“Around the world, company groups and concentrated 
ownership are normal, the exceptions being in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia.  
Under such conditions, RPTs are mainly with the controlling shareholders and/or with members of 
a company group.”).  This analysis should not be read as an approval of self-dealing.  As Professor 
Moon put it, “[t]he normative merits of self-dealing transactions are at best murky.  After all, 
controlling shareholders can wield their power to expropriate minority shareholders by engaging in 
transactions that enrich themselves . . . . But the normative desirability of self-dealing 
transactions . . . depends on the web of regulatory laws and market conditions.”  Moon, supra note 
247, at 44. 
 266. Shareholder litigation is a costly and timely endeavor.  Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 85–86 (2011).  This is not to 
say that shareholder derivative litigation is not a useful and protection mechanism to prevent abuses 
of managerial misconduct.  Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in 
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345–46 (1993). 
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engage in ‘self-dealing’ transactions as part of normal business.”267  This 
difference in typical business styles is a strong headwind in pushing foreign-
based companies to jurisdictions that allow for such interconnected business 
structures.268 
Moreover, in the United States, when directors have stakes on both ends 
of a business dealing, only the independent directors can cleanse the 
company’s deal.269  The demand for “independent directors” presents an issue 
for many Chinese companies, as management is routinely helmed by firm 
founders and socially connected directors.270  Although the Hughes court 
does not cite Marchand’s analysis of the impact that social connections have 
on director independence,271 it does analogize to Marchand in its oversight 
analysis.272  Therefore, the Hughes court’s reliance on Marchand as an 
analogous case does little to assuage potential concerns that foreign-
corporation managers might have about how Delaware judges would view 
the directors’ decisions.273  
Hughes represents a potential turning point for Delaware’s place as an 
international supplier of corporate governance law.274  Foreign corporations 
 
 267. Moon, supra note 247, at 36.  “[T]he United States is fairly unique in the world, in terms of 
the relative lack of self-dealing transactions and corporate groups.”  Id. at 55.  
 268. Some jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands require the court’s permission before 
bringing a derivative suit and courts consider “the interests of the company taking account of the 
views of the company’s directors on commercial matters” and “the costs of the proceedings in 
relation to the relief likely to be obtained.”  BVI Business Companies Act, 2004, §§ 184C (V.I.).  
Pleading thresholds in other jurisdictions are so high and recoveries so limited as to make derivative 
suits unappealing.  Breach of Duty by Director of a Cayman Fund – The Path to Investor Relief in 
the Cayman Islands vs New York, MOURANT 4 (July 2017), https://www.mourant.com/file-
library/media—-2016/2016-guides/breach-of-duty-by-director-of-a-cayman-fund.pdf.  
 269. When select directors are considered “interested” in a potential dealing—because of a 
personal, financial, or any other reason—only “disinterested” directors can approve, or “cleanse,” 
the company’s involvement in that deal.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); DEL. 
CODE  ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested 
Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 905 (2011).  Another way to “cleanse” these types of deals 
is via a shareholder’s vote of approval.  DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2020). 
 270. Moon, supra note 247, at 45–46; Sang Yop Kang, The Independent Director System in 
China: Weaknesses, Dilemmas, and Potential Silver Linings, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 151, 153–
54 (2017). 
 271. Compare Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) (“[T]he fact that fellow 
directors are social acquaintances . . . does not, in itself, raise a fair inference of non-
independence . . . . [A]ny realistic consideration of the question of independence must give weight 
to these important relationships and their natural effect on the ability of the parties to act 
impartially . . . .”), with Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 30–38 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
27, 2020) (making no mention of Marchand’s social connections analysis).  
 272. Hughes, slip op. at 35–36. 
 273. See Moon, supra note 247, at 46 (“Given this reality, it is unlikely that Delaware courts will 
find appointed ‘independent’ directors in China to be truly independent.”). 
 274. See infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text.  
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that look to Hughes see the possibility of costly, continuous, and seemingly 
unwarranted shareholder litigation based solely on a perceived animosity 
towards their typical business practices.275  Therefore, Delaware will appear 
uninviting and, consequently, open the door for new nations to compete for 
these corporations’ business.276  This new competition—coupled with 
institutional investors’ seeming acceptance of corporations incorporating in 
“lax” jurisdictions—further promotes a Delaware exodus.277  Therefore, 
desires to maintain typical local business market practices will lead to 
foreign-corporations incorporating in more compatible jurisdictions.278   
C. Delaware Courts, in Caremark Liability Analyses, Should Allow for 
“Territorial Adjustments” 
Corporation law is big business in Delaware.279  Moreover, the state 
government is aware of the outsized role of corporate franchise taxes on the 
state.280  However, as more countries begin to offer competitive corporate law 
regimes281 that protect directors and companies from costly shareholder 
 
 275. See supra notes 259–273 and accompanying text; see Moon, supra note 247, at 8–9 (“[I]f 
a corporation operates predominantly in China—where self-dealing transactions are routine, 
tolerated by local authorities, and constitute an important strategy to compete in certain sectors—
that corporation would be averse to Delaware law . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Erickson, supra note 
266, at 85–86. 
 276. Moon, supra note 246, at 1409 (“[A] handful of foreign nation states are actively vying to 
gain a share of the American corporate law market.”). 
 277. Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 231 (2018) (“[T]he 
rise of institutional investors has transformed the ownership of U.S. corporations.  Institutional 
investors, such as investment managers and pension funds, now invest the overwhelming majority 
of capital in U.S. corporations and have the capability to determine corporations’ choice of 
arrangements.”) (footnote omitted); Moon, supra note 247, at 47, 49 (“Institutional investors in the 
United States thus far have not (successfully) demanded that Chinese firms incorporate in 
Delaware.”). 
 278. Moon, supra note 247, at 49 (noting that the lack of institutional investor pressure on 
foreign-based firms to include “enhanced contractual safeguards” indicates that incorporation in 
non-Delaware jurisdictions—primarily Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—is based 
more on “corporate governance rules that comport with local market conditions rather than 
facilitating fraud”). 
 279. Moon, supra note 246, at 1429–30 (“Delaware’s incorporation fee revenues, which are 
often heralded as the textbook case of legislative dependence on corporate charter fees, averaged 
17% of the state’s total tax revenue over the past several decades.”). 
 280. Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, DEL. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 
https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2020/documents/operating/financial-summary.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2020) (estimating revenues from incorporation revenues to be 27.6% of all revenues 
for the fiscal year 2020). 
 281. While roughly three additional countries—Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the 
Cayman Islands—might not seem like a significant jump in the number of competitors, it is worth 
noting that Delaware is not earnestly competing with other American states.  Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (“[T]he 
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derivative litigation,282 Delaware corporation law risks diminishing in 
value.283  Delaware’s government seems aware of this potential calamity, as 
it routinely touts the benefits of its corporation laws for international 
businesses.284  Therefore, if Delaware wishes to remain a leading supplier of 
corporate law to foreign firms listed in U.S. stock markets, something must 
change.285 
The Hughes holding’s warning signals indicate the best places for 
immediate adjustments: the treatment of the typical business operations in 
legally-weak jurisdictions and the unworkability of genuinely independent 
directors in several countries to cleanse self-dealings.286  The courts possess 
greater institutional competency to handle independent adjustments based on 
a business’s primary operating market given the analysis’s fact-intensive 
nature.287  In contrast, the legislature is the better institution to address self-
dealings since these standards are primarily enumerated.288 
Any potential amendments to self-dealing statutes are fraught with 
possible widespread policy concerns regarding shareholder protections.289  
Delaware’s self-dealing statute offers several means to cleanse self-deals;290 
however, local business practices make these options relatively unworkable 
to many foreign-based companies.291  While self-dealing can provide some 
potentially useful benefits,292 loosening the restrictions would likely harm 
minority shareholders.293  Moreover, America is unique in that corporate law 
 
very notion that states compete for incorporation[] is a myth.  Other than Delaware, no state is 
engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies.”). 
 282. Erickson, supra note 266, at 86. 
 283. As companies avoid or—more alarmingly to the Delaware legislature—leave Delaware as 
their place of incorporation, the state both loses revenue and Delaware corporation law loses its 
allure as the “gold standard” of corporation law.  See supra notes 245, 280 and accompanying text.  
 284. Beyond the Borders: Delaware’s Benefits for International Business, DELAWARE, 
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-benefits-international-business/ (last visited Feb. 13, 
2020). 
 285. See infra notes 296–344 and accompanying text.  
 286. See supra Section IV.B. 
 287. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (“Delaware chancery judges are known 
for their expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation for its sophistication 
in corporate law.”). 
 288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2020). 
 289. See infra notes 290–295 and accompanying text.  
 290. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144(a)(1)–(3) (2020). 
 291. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.  
 292. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 293. Moon, supra note 247, at 44 (“[C]ontrolling shareholders can wield their power to 
expropriate minority shareholders by engaging in transactions that enrich themselves . . . . In its 
most perverse form, self-dealing is the legalized looting of minority shareholders.”).  Moreover, the 
controlling normative theory of business ethics in America is the shareholder (or stockholder) 
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is not handled by the federal government.294  Therefore, given America’s 
general animosity towards self-dealing, a loosening of these standards might 
prompt a federal reaction.295  Consequently, since these related-party 
transactions might never be adequately cleansed, the number of Caremark 
suits foreign corporations could face will only continue to grow as a result.   
Therefore, in Caremark liability analyses, I propose that Delaware 
courts allow for “territorial adjustments“ in determining the acceptable level 
of oversight for companies that primarily do business in non-American 
markets.296  This proposition leverages both the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s and the Delaware Supreme Court’s business expertise,297 and the 
fact-intensive nature of Caremark analyses298 to achieve a potentially 
equitable and business-friendly approach.299  The core of this proposition is 
not a rewriting or lowering of Caremark’s “bottom-line requirement,”300 but 
rather a reconsidering of Caremark’s “good faith” effort standards by 
considering the sophistication of the business’s underlying primary 
market.301  Caremark liability is a fact-intensive judicially created concept; 
therefore, the addition of a territorial factor—which would also be a fact-
intensive inquiry—is well within the court’s institutional capabilities.302 
 
theory, which holds that a firm’s primary responsibility is to its shareholders.  H. Jeff Smith, The 
Shareholders vs. Stakeholders Debate, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (July 15, 2003), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/.  Therefore, judges 
would not likely view even cleansed deals favorably should they do significant damage to minority 
shareholders.  Id.; Moon, supra note 247, at 44. 
 294. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 
REGULATION 26, 26 (2003) (“For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state 
law.”). 
 295. Under the “‘‘stockholder’ theory,” actions that harm stockholders are viewed as suspect.  
Smith, supra note 293.  Therefore, if self-dealing was allowed to be more pervasive under America’s 
leading provider of corporate governance law, then the potential harms would justify the federal 
government preempting such a potentially harmful piece of legislation.  Chris Brummer, Corporate 
Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2008) 
(“Delaware provides law in the shadow of the threat of federal intervention, and from this vantage 
point preemption serves as the primary discipline and motivation for efficient laws.  Yet even here, 
the federal government cannot and does not monitor all of Delaware’s lawmaking.”) (footnote 
omitted); Bainbridge, supra note 294, at 26. 
 296. See infra notes 297–344 and accompanying text. 
 297. Fisch, supra note 287, at 1078.  
 298. In re Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at 
*14–15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (showing that analysis of liability under Caremark is a rigorous 
inquiry that will depend on the facts of the case). 
 299. See infra notes 318–320 and accompanying text.  
 300. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019). 
 301. See infra notes 313–320, and accompanying text. 
 302. In re Puda Coal, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at *14–15; Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 
364–65, 370 (Del. 2006) (accepting and defining the prongs of Caremark liability). 
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The Hughes decision is correct303—mainly due to the company’s 
excessive laissez-faire concern for oversight.304  The court rendered its 
decision at the motion to dismiss stage,305 a stage that most Caremark cases 
rarely survive.306  Caremark cases that survive a motion to dismiss typically 
present facts showing that a board—in fact or in practice—failed to either 
implement any board-level oversight or ignored some legal risk.307  Both 
failings were present in Hughes.308  Therefore, this suggestion is not a plea to 
overturn the Hughes holding.309  Instead, this proposal addresses potential 
misgivings that future foreign-company directors—who try in good faith to 
attempt proper oversight—might have when considering incorporation in 
Delaware because of the Hughes holding.310  A duology of cases presents the 
intellectual framework underpinning this proposal.311 
In In re General Motors Co. Derivative Litigation,312 the Delaware 
Chancery Court acknowledged that while boards may miss critical oversight 
risks within their companies, affirmative actions by the board to try and 
become aware of these risks represent “some oversight.”313  Moreover, the 
General Motors court noted that the plaintiff’s arguments that the board 
“should have . . . had a better reporting system” carried little weight.314  
Likewise, in In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware 
Chancery Court expressed that “[c]ompanies . . . should all try to be as law 
 
 303. See supra Section IV.A for a longer discussion of the Hughes decision in relation to 
standing precedent.  
 304. The court spent considerable time referencing the disconnect between the limited time the 
audit committee met and the critical work the board tasked the committee with doing.  Hughes v. 
Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 9–16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).  The court also stressed the 
seeming disregard the company had towards quickly addressing the critical accounting failures.  Id. 
at 5, 14, 17. 
 305. Id. at 2. 
 306. Pollman, supra note 191, at 2036.  See supra notes 254–260 and accompanying text. 
 307. Pollman, supra note 191, at 2036–37. 
 308. Hughes, slip op. at 5, 9–17.  Had the audit committee spent more time—both in terms of 
literal total time and time of actual critical review—considering the financial reports or were more 
critical of management’s ability to provide meaningful and accurate information to the committee, 
this case might not have survived the motion to dismiss.  Id. at 35–36 (distinguishing the case at 
hand from General Motors, where the board had demonstrated “some oversight” and therefore were 
not violating Caremark).   
 309. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text. 
 310. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text.  
 311. See infra notes 290–298 and accompanying text. 
 312. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872 (Del. Ch. June 
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016). 
 313. Id. at *15 (noting that the creation of the “Finance and Risk Committee” and “Audit 
Committee” equated to positive actions undertaken by the board to become aware of potential risks). 
 314. Id. at *15 (“Plaintiffs concede that the Board was exercising some oversight, albeit not to 
the Plaintiffs’ hindsight-driven satisfaction.”). 
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compliant as [they] can.”315  The court noted that company oversight is—
realistically—never perfect, and therefore the “reasonableness of peoples’ 
efforts at compliance” is proportional to the risks and the business.316  The 
Puda Coal court also provided an apt example of what directors for 
principally foreign-based companies—in this case, China—should do to 
meet Caremark’s “good faith” standard.317  In particular, the court noted that 
directors should be physically located in and have the language skills to 
operate in the “environment in which the company is operating.”318  If courts 
require directors to have the skills to operate successfully within their 
business’s specific operating environment, then, logically, the courts must be 
able to identify what a successful business operation looks like in non-
American markets.319  General Motors and Puda Coal together create a 
notion that, with regard to Caremark liability, directors operating in their 
unique markets must reasonably try to be “successful” and should not be held 
to overly punitive or U.S.-centric evaluations in hindsight.320  
However, many practitioners might have concerns with judges 
“territorially adjusting” a company’s acceptable level of oversight.321  One 
potential concern of having judges consider the underlying primary business 
market while determining Caremark liability is that it would create two 
separate standards for businesses—based solely on the primary place of 
business.  Essentially, one standard would be considered the “traditional,” 
(and presumably stricter) standard for “American” companies,322 and the 
other being a “territorially-adjusted,” (and presumably more lenient) standard 
for “foreign” companies.323  On its face, this bifurcated standard would 
 
 315. In re Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at *15 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013). 
 316. Id. at *15 (“[Y]ou can be at a company where it has a $25 billion market cap and it’s 
assessed a $45 million regulatory penalty . . . . That proportionality comes into play in assessing 
Caremark and the reasonableness of peoples’ efforts at compliance because you can’t watch 
everybody everywhere.”). 
 317. Id. at *14 (noting that “you better have your physical body in China an awful lot . . . 
have . . . a system of controls to make sure that you know that you actually own the assets . . . have 
the language skills to navigate the environment in which the company is operating . . . [and] retain[] 
accountants and lawyers who are fit to the task of maintaining a system of controls over a public 
company”).  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text.  
 321. See infra notes 324, 331–333 and accompanying text. 
 322. In this context, “American” refers to those companies that do most of their business in the 
U.S. or U.S.-like markets and are therefore subject to present (i.e., “traditional”) Caremark liability 
standard.  
 323. In this context “foreign” refers to those companies that do most of their business in non-
U.S.-like markets and are therefore subject to a territorially adjusted Caremark liability standard. 
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potentially drive companies operating in “traditional” jurisdictions to 
“territorially-adjusted” jurisdictions,324 thereby exacerbating the exact 
problem Delaware would try to avoid.325  However, this interpretation misses 
the mark, as the division between “American” and “foreign” companies is 
not meant to be a “bright-line” rule based solely on a company’s location, but 
a more comprehensive inquiry into how companies in that region conduct 
business in those markets.326   
In practice, judicial consideration of a company’s underlying business 
market would be comparable to the consideration of the company’s industry 
when considering sufficient oversight, which the Delaware Chancery Court 
has routinely taken into consideration when considering “bad faith” in 
oversight.327  As such, judicial consideration of a company’s underlying 
business market would help courts better understand what oversight 
measures the challenged company attempted—or, in the case of Hughes, did 
not attempt328—and to better determine if the company missed the “red flags” 
that were either “waived [sic] in one’s face or displayed so that they are 
visible to the careful observer.”329  Therefore, this new consideration—like 
the court’s consideration of the company’s industry—is a means of giving 
 
 324. The norm for corporate managers is to attempt to maximize shareholder value.  Alicia E. 
Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to 
New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS 221, 242 (2012).  But see Afra Afsharipour, 
Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465, 468 
(2017) (noting that there are challenges to this norm).  Therefore, similar to some tax reduction 
practices, managers might determine that reincorporating to the perceived “more lenient” 
jurisdiction would achieve greater shareholder value than remaining in the perceived “more 
stringent” jurisdiction.  See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
 326. For example, suppose the “market” in the fictional country of Luciland is highly similar to 
the American market, and the challenged company primarily does business there.  In this case, it 
stands to reason that courts should view the company under a more “American-like” conception of 
typical “good faith,” considering the typical business practices of that region.  On the other hand, 
suppose the “market” in the fictional country of Elvisland is more lenient towards “self-dealings” 
in corporate groups, and the challenged company primarily does business there.  In that case, the 
court should consider Elvisland’s business realities when determining Caremark liability while also 
not forgetting the minimal requirements established under Delaware case law. 
 327. In re MetLife Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0452-SG, 2020 WL 4746635, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 
2020) (“Regarding the second Caremark prong—at issue here—a plaintiff can establish a board’s 
bad faith by showing that it saw red flags related to compliance with law and consciously 
disregarded those flags.”).  For example, in Marchand, the court was explicit in saying that the “red 
flags” were failings in being compliant with food safety requirements, which were “critical to the 
company’s business operation.”  Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 816, 822 (Del. 2019).  Here, 
operating within the business realities of the primary place of business would also be mission 
critical.  See supra notes 317–319, and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 329. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, 
at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (quoting Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008)). 
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context to, and not alleviation from, what constitutes “sustained or systemic 
failure[s]” of board oversight.330   
Another potential criticism is that this “territorial-adjustment” 
consideration would not go far enough in assuaging foreign-corporation 
directors of potential litigation risks.331  Although this criticism bears some 
weight—for if other jurisdictions can offer greater accommodations,332 then 
why select Delaware corporation law at all333—it misses the critical benefit 
of incorporating in Delaware, which is access to the full complement of 
Delaware’s case law and the courts that make it.334 
When foreign corporations incorporate in the United States, they are 
typically buying into a suite of laws: state corporate law, federal securities 
laws, and various other business regulations.335  The benefit of “buying” this 
suite—with Delaware corporate law being the first “product” in the bundle—
versus shopping around for the best “deal”—is Delaware’s extensive case 
law.336  Because of its near-universal familiarity,337 this large body of case 
law creates both predictability338 and lowered transaction costs for 
 
 330. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(emphasis added) (“Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated 
upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a sustained or 
systemic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the lack of good faith that is a 
necessary condition to liability.”) (emphasis added). 
 331. See infra notes 332–333 and accompanying text. 
 332. Here, “accommodations” especially refers to those accommodations offered by non-U.S. 
jurisdictions to potentially decrease the litigation risks from shareholder derivative suits.  See supra 
note 268. 
 333. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.  
 334. See infra notes 335–345 and accompanying text. 
 335. Omari S. Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 224 (2015). 
 336. Jonathan G. Rohr, Corporate Governance, Collective Action and Contractual Freedom: 
Justifying Delaware’s New Restrictions on Private Ordering, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 803, 817 (2017) 
(“The case law ‘provides a pool of handy precedents, and the basis for obtaining almost 
instantaneously a legal opinion on any issue of Delaware law.  These features of stability and 
predictability are desired by managers who need quick opinions on proposed activities.’”) (quoting 
Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
225, 274 (1985)).  There are also other benefits to “buying” Delaware corporation law, such as 
“signaling” to potential investors.  Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s 
Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 299–300 (2015).  But those benefits won’t be discussed 
further in this Note.   
 337. As aptly described by Professors Broughman and Ibrahim, Delaware corporation law is the 
“lingua franca,” or bridge language, of corporation law.  Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 336, at 
277–78. 
 338. Rohr, supra note 336, at 817–18; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: 
A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 212 (2011) (““The 
judicial opinions that result from frequent litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network, 
because such opinions provide firms with interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate 
law.”“). 
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corporations.339  Therefore, leaving or avoiding Delaware corporation law 
because of fear of litigation might be both an overreaction to a solvable 
problem340 and a needless avoidance of a potentially valuable good.341  
A “territorial-adjustment” will not eliminate the potential for costly 
litigation; however, it will allow the courts to create specific case law that 
“rewards”342 foreign-based companies that in “good faith” try to reach 
Delaware’s standards and punishes those truly “bad-actors.”343  Moreover, 
this suggestion does not require eviscerating Delaware’s established 
standards in corporate governance; instead, it merely proposes a discretionary 
supplement the court may use depending on the specific case.344  Therefore, 
as courts adjudicate more cases using the “territorial-adjustment” 
consideration, foreign-based companies operating in “good faith” gain both 
protection from this new branch of case law while still having access to the 
full breadth of Delaware case law.345 
The Delaware Chancery Court has both the expertise and ability to 
facilitate the fact-intensive inquiries necessary to consider a business’s 
primary marketplace’s sophistication.346  Therefore, the court should 
consider “territorially-adjusting” what its Caremark good faith standard is on 
a case-by-case basis to account for the variety of corporate governance 
styles.347  
 
 339. Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 336, at 300; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 281, at 725–
26 (noting that although a competing state might “copy[]” Delaware’s corporate code and instruct 
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 340. See infra notes 342–345 and accompanying text. 
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default judgment entered on a stockholder’s demand to inspect books and records).  See generally 
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publicly-traded company “going dark”). 
 344. See supra notes 297–319 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Manesh, supra note 338, at 212 (“The judicial opinions that result from frequent 
litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network, because such opinions provide firms with 
interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate law.”). 
 346. Fisch, supra note 287, at 1078. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Hughes v. Hu,348 the Delaware Chancery Court noted that the Kandi 
board of directors did not implement nor maintain sufficient board-level 
oversight controls for the company’s accounting practices or related-party 
transactions.349  The court correctly held that the Kandi board of directors 
faced a substantial threat of liability under Caremark and denied the board’s 
motion to dismiss the shareholder derivative suit.350 
But the court’s holding will likely exacerbate the current trend of 
foreign-based companies avoiding Delaware as their place of 
incorporation.351  The decline in foreign-companies incorporating following 
Hughes will likely decrease Delaware franchise tax revenues,352 and signal 
to other foreign-based companies that viable and attractive alternatives to 
Delaware’s corporate governance rules are available.353  Jurisdictions such as 
the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands have already begun 
developing favorable legal protections for companies that operate in non-
American markets by establishing specialized business courts, staffed with 
qualified business law jurists, aimed at resolving complex corporate law 
questions.354 
Delaware precedent seems to create no room for the courts to consider 
non-American corporate governance styles when determining Caremark 
liability;355 however, the General Motors and Puda Coal duology marks a 
dormant thinking within the Delaware Chancery Court that the “successful 
operation” of a company varies depending on the company’s primary 
marketplace.356  Therefore, in an effort to achieve a more equitable and 
business-friendly approach, Delaware courts should allow for “territorial 
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adjustments” in determining the acceptable level of oversight for companies 
that primarily do business in non-American markets.357 
 
 357. See supra Section IV.C. 
